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Wills, Trusts, and Administration
of Estates
by James C. Rehberg
The usual volume of cases involving issues of fiduciary law reached
the appellate courts of Georgia during this past survey period. While
the number of such cases was not large, they were noteworthy. Also, the
1994 session of the Georgia General Assembly was not particularly
active in the area covered by this Article. The few bills which were
enacted will be summarized in Part III.
I.

RECENT DECISIONS--WILLS AND ADMINSTRATION

Multiple-PartyAccounts
The only use of a will substitute during this survey period appeared
in a case involving the disposition of the proceeds of several certificates
of deposit.1 Whenever a decedent is at death a party to a multiple-party
account, the personal representative must determine what, if any,
interest in the account survived in the estate. A failure to pursue such
an interest, if there is one, could well be a breach of the duty to collect
and protect estate assets. Since these accounts are basically contractual,
the rights of the parties may be terminated or modified by contract.
Lowe v. Barnett Bank of Atlanta2 is instructive as to the advantages
and disadvantages of a will substitute. The intestate had purchased five
certificates of deposit, four of them in the name of intestate or a named
sister and one in the name of intestate or her husband. Two of these
five certificates expressly created a right of survivorship; the other three
did not. The intestate, along with her brother and another sister, later
A.

* Professor Emeritus, Walter F. George School of Law, Mercer University. Mercer
University (A.B., 1940; J.D., 1948); Duke University (LL.M., 1952). Member, State Bar of

Georgia.
1. Lowe v. Barnett Bank of Atlanta, 209 Ga. App. 112, 433 S.E.2d 294 (1993).
2. 209 Ga. App. 112, 433 S.E.2d 294 (1993).
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went to the issuing bank and instructed it to remove the names of her
husband and the named sister, both of whom had died. Then, the
intestate instructed the issuing bank to add her brother to her safety
deposit account and her money market account, and to add the name of
another sister to the fifth certificate. The bank made all these changes
pursuant to its established practices. All personal information as to
these various payees and the certificate changes mentioned were entered
into the bank's central computer system. The bank required the
intestate to produce the death certificates of the deceased payees, but did
not require her to sign any other bank forms to effectuate the changes.
The bank then typed a memorandum to the data processing system
the changes and gave the intestate a copy of the memoranrequesting
3
dum.

The intestate died six days later, and it was not until the following
day that the data was entered into the bank's data processing system.
When the administrator of the decedent's estate went to the bank to
claim the proceeds of the certificates as assets of the estate, the bank
refused to pay the proceeds. Instead, the bank paid those proceeds to
the payees named in the changes which had been entered into the data
processing system.4 On an interlocutory appeal, the Georgia Court of
Appeals held in favor of the bank.' Neither the statute stating that the
funds on deposit in a joint account at the death of a party to the account
belong to the surviving party or parties as against the estate," nor the
statute stating how the terms of a joint account may be changed 7 was
applicable to the facts of this case.' When the intestate made the
changes at the bank, she was the only person with a present right of
withdrawal, because at that point the other parties to the joint
certificates had died. No written authorization from the intestate was
required. The deaths left her as the only party to the accounts. When
she produced the death certificates of the other parties and had their
names removed, the accounts were no longer joint, but became individual
accounts in her name only. However, the joint and survivor accounts
she created were valid and at her death passed to the surviving parties
to the new accounts.

3.

Id. at 113, 433 S.E.2d at 295.

4. Id.
5. Id. at 114, 433 S.E.2d at 296.
6.

O.C.G.A. § 7-1-813(a) (1989).

7.

Id. § 7-1-814.

8. Lowe, 209 Ga. App. at 114, 433 S.E.2d at 296.
9. Id.
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B. Administration of Estates
Appointment of Administrator. Both the Georgia Court of
Appeals and the Georgia Supreme Court carefully reconsidered the rules
for granting letters of administration.' The reconsideration resulted
in a thinly veiled suggestion by the latter that the General Assembly
McClinton v. Sullivan 2
might similarly reconsider these rules."
prompted this reconsideration. There, after the death of the wife and
the appointment of her father as temporary administrator, the husband
filed a caveat and a petition that he be appointed administrator. It was
undisputed that the wife died intestate and that she was survived by her
husband, her father and mother, and two siblings, but by no descendants. The problem was that she had an action for divorce pending at
her death. 3 The first rule in section 53-6-24 of the Official Code of
Georgia Annotated ("O.C.G.A.") was amended in 1986 to bar appointment of the surviving spouse if there was a divorce proceeding pending
at the death of the other spouse. 4
The probate court barred the husband's appointment, denied the
father's petition for appointment, and instead, appointed the county
administrator.1 " The father did not appeal, in his own right, the denial
of his appointment. 6 Instead, he petitioned for his appointment on the
ground that he, his wife, and the two siblings were the "next of kin"
him
under O.C.G.A. subsection 53-6-24(a)(2) and that they had selected
17
for appointment pursuant to O.C.G.A. subsection 53-6-24(a)(3).
The court of appeals, in a five-to-four decision, affirmed the appointment of the county administrator, holding that the father, mother, and
siblings -could not qualify as next of kin because the husband survived
as sole heir.; Since the husband was barred from qualifying by virtue
of the 1986 amendment and there was no other person properly before
the probate court for appointment, the probate court correctly appointed
the county administrator.19 However, the minority on the court of
appeals was convinced that by disqualifying the divorcing spouse and

10. O.C.GA. § 53-6-24 (1982 & Supp. 1994).
11. McClinton v. Sullivan, 263 Ga. 711, 712-13, 438 S.E.2d 71, 73 (1994).
12. 208 Ga. App. 411, 430 S.E.2d 794 (1993), cert.granted.
13. Id. at 411, 430 S.E.2d at 796.
14. 1986 Ga. Laws 200 (amending O.C.G.A. § 53-6-24(1) (1982)).
15. 208 Ga. App. at 413, 430 S.E.2d at 797.
16. Id. at 411, 430 S.E.2d at 796.

17. Id.
18.

Id. at 412, 430 S.E.2d at 796.

19. Id.
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then declaring that the next of kin should be next entitled, the Georgia
Legislature was referring to the next of kin after the surviving spouse.
Therefore, only after exhausting the possibility of a qualified person from
that0 group would it be appropriate to appoint the county administra2
tor.

The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed, 2' specifically addressing the
argument that the father of the decedent should have been appointed,
as next of kin, because he was next in line to inherit from the decedent. 22 That argument, the supreme court noted, erroneously assumed
that the husband's disqualification to serve as administrator also served
to disinherit him and put-the-father next in line to inherit from his
deceased daughter.'l It did not have that effect. While O.C.G.A.
subsection 53-6-24(a)(1) disqualified the husband from serving as
administrator, it did not change his status as sole heir of his wife, who
left no descendants.2'
Looking beyond this case, the supreme court agreed with the court of
appeals that the entire O.C.G.A. section 53-6-24 "leaves much to be
desired in regards to the issue raised in the appeal. ' The court, in a
footnote, suggested two issues it did not have to address in this case but
which are left open by the present statute.2 These issues are: first,
whether a surviving spouse who is disqualified to serve because of a
pending divorce proceeding has the right to select the administrator;
second, whether a surviving spouse who is sole heir is barred from
selecting a qualified disinterested person when that surviving spouse is
himself or herself disqualified.2 7 It thus appears that O.C.G.A. section
53-6-24 is in for more changes. Indeed, the supreme court concluded its
opinion with the following suggestion: "Rather than wait for further
judicial interpretation, the General Assembly may desire to address this
issue in a more definitive manner.' 2

20.
21.
22.
23.

208 Ga. App. at 415, 430 S.E.2d at 798-99 (Birdsong, J., dissenting).
McClinton v. Sullivan, 263 Ga. 711, 438 S.E.2d 71 (1994).
Id. at 712, 438 S.E.2d at 73.
Id.

24. Id.
25. Id. The court cited Headman v. Rose, 63 Ga. 458(6) (1879), which held that if a
surviving widow were disqualified "for any cause" she would, as widow, have the right to
name a qualified person. Id.
26. McClinton, 263 Ga. at 712, 438 S.E.2d at 73 n.2.
27. Id. at 712, 438 S.E.2d at 73.
28. Id.
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Succession to Property. Georgia's "slayer statute" 9 denies the
right of a killer to inherit or otherwise succeed to the property of the
victim.3" Such statutes, being in derogation of the common law, are
strictly construed.31 This survey period saw two cases reach the court
of appeals for decision as to the applicability and construction of this
statute. In Hammond v. Sanders2 a husband shot and killed his wife
and almost immediately shot and killed himself. A declaratory judgment
action was brought by the husband's administrator for determination as
to whether the wife predeceased the husband.' Instead of passing on
this issue, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the
wife's estate, reasoning that the husband's estate would be barred by the
"slayer statute" from inheriting from the wife." On appeal, the court
of appeals vacated the judgment and did not reach any of the substantive issues.' Instead, the court held that the petition simply failed to
make out a case for a declaratory judgment." The petition failed to
allege that the administrator of the husband's estate faced any
uncertainty or that he needed any direction from the court to prevent
action which would jeopardize the interests of the husband's estate.3 7
While administrators may be entitled to judicial guidance in the form of
a declaratory judgment, this case did not set forth the preconditions for
such relief. The court apparently reasoned that there was simply no
justiciable controversy before it. As it pointed out, the matters sought
by the petition are normally resolved in probate court during administration of the husband's estate or in a claim for the proceeds of the
husband's life insurance. 9
.Keith v. Johnson," however, got to the very purpose of the "slayer
statute." There, a husband killed his wife and himself in an apparent
murder-suicide plot. The executor of the wife's estate filed for a
declaratory judgment that the wife's estate was the sole heir of the

29. O.C.G.A § 534-6 (1982).
30. Id.
31. See, e.g., O.C.G-A. § 33-25-13 (1990), likewise bars a murderer from collecting
insurance benefits on the life of his victim.
32. 210 Ga. App. 307, 436 S.E.2d 45 (1993).
33. Id. at 307, 436 S.E.2d at 46.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 308, 436 S.E.2d at 47.
36. Id.
37. Id., 436 at 46.
38. Id., 436 S.E.2d at 47.
39. Id., 436 S.E.2d at 46.
40. 211 Ga. App. 678, 440 S.E.2d 230 (1993).
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husband because the statute provides that the killer shall be treated as
though he had predeceased the victim. 41 The trial court so held, but
was reversed on appeal.4 2 The court of appeals held the purpose of the
statute was clearly to deprive the killer and his heirs of any property of
the victim.' In this case, neither the killer nor his heirs claimed any
property of the victim. The presumptions in the order of the deaths of
the killer and the victim address the distribution of the victim's, not the
killer's, estate."
Virtual Adoption. The claim that one is entitled to share in the
distribution of a decedent's estate is usually raised, if at all, prior to or
in the early stages of an administration proceeding. This applies to the
claim that one is a virtually adopted heir of an intestate. Two recent
cases emphasized that regardless of the form of action in which the
claim is asserted, its validity ultimately will rest on the proof of a
contract to adopt, be it oral or written, express or implied.'
In Davis v. Bennett" the claimants were children of the decedent's
first wife by her previous marriage. She married the decedent in 1926,
and they remained married until her death in 1967. The decedent then
married the defendant and, at his death, was survived by her as his
widow. In the 1940s he had acquired title to a six-acre tract, where the
family lived until his death in 1989. The tract was awarded to the
widow as year's support. The claimants then sued to impress a trust on
the tract, basing their claim upon the alleged fact that they were
virtually adopted children of the decedent and, as such, were heirs
entitled to share in his intestate estate.4 7 A jury verdict in their favor,
however, was reversed by the supreme court on the ground that the
evidence in the record failed to show the existence of a specific contract
to adopt.' Absent such a showing, a virtual adoption is not shown.49
The only evidence offered by the claimants was their own testimony that
they considered the decedent to be their father and that their mother
cared for him when he was ill. They admitted that they had never
talked with him about an adoption. The claimants did offer evidence

41.

Id, at 681, 440 S.E.2d at 233 (citing O.C.G-A. § 53-4-6 (1982)).

42. Id. at 682, 440 S.E.2d at 234.
43.

Id. at 681, 440 S.E.2d at 233.

44. Id.
45. See Davis v. Bennett, 263 Ga. 714,438 S.E.2d 73 (1994); O'Neal v. Wilkes, 263 Ga.
850, 438 S.E.2d 490 (1994).
46. 263 Ga. 714, 438 S.E.2d 73 (1994).
47. Id. at 714, 438 S.E.2d at 74.
48. Id. at 715, 438 S.E.2d at 74.

49. Id.
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that they were listed as his children in his obituary, but that is not
evidence of a contract to adopt.' There being no evidence of such a
contract, a judgment notwithstanding the verdict was not supported by
the evidence.5
Not only must there be a contract to adopt before a virtual adoption
may be decreed, but the contract must also be between parties each of
whom had legal authority to make such a contract.5 2 The plaintiff in
O'Neal v. Wilkes' was born out of wedlock in 1949. Her biological
father never recognized her as his daughter, never supported her, and
never took any steps to legitimate her. For four years after her mother's
death, plaintiff passed through the physical custody of three different
individuals before ending with a Mr. and Mrs. Cook. The Cooks never
statutorily adopted plaintiff, but they reared her and provided for her
education until she married in 1975. She never took the last name of
Cook, but Mr. Cook referred to her as his daughter and later identified
her children as his grandchildren. After Mr. Cook's intestate death in
1991, his administrator refused to recognize plaintiff's asserted interest
in the estate. Plaintiff filed a bill for a declaration of virtual adoption
that would entitle her to take as an heir."
Plaintiff's argument concerning the existence of a contract to adopt
was based on the assertion that the last person who had physical
custody of her, prior to the Cooks, was her paternal aunt, who agreed to
and did turn her over to the Cooks in 1961.' The supreme court, with
two justices dissenting, agreed with the trial court's finding that there
was never a valid contract to adopt and, therefore, no virtual adoption." Only the mother of a child born out of wedlock is legally
entitled to custody of the child, unless the father has legitimated the
child.57 Admittedly, the father had not legitimated this child.
Plaintiff conceded that, after her mother's death, no guardianship
petition was filed by her relatives, nor had any person petitioned for
appointment as her legal custodian. 9 It followed that the obligation
assumed successively by the various persons who had custody was not

50. Id., 438 S.E.2d at 75.

51. I&
52.
53.
54.
55.

O'Neal v. Wilkes, 263 Ga. 850, 439 S.E.2d 490 (1994).
263 Ga. 850, 439 S.E.2d 490 (1994).
Id. at 851, 439 S.E.2d at 491.
Id. at 852, 439 S.E.2d at 491.

56. Id,
57. Id., 439 S.E.2d at 492.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 853, 439 S.E.2d at 492.
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a legal obligation, but a familial one, carrying no authority to contract
for plaintiff's adoption.'
Admitting that the majority correctly stated the current judge-made
rule in Georgia, the dissenting justices reasoned that when the child,
though technically not a party to it, has fully performed the alleged
contract, then equity should enforce it, notwithstanding the fact that the
contract is unenforceable because the person who consented to the
adoption had no legal authority to do so."'
Will Contests
The basic rules for a valid execution of a will are that the attesting
witnesses must sign in the presence of the testator, that the testator
must either sign in the presence of the witnesses or acknowledge his
signature to any witnesses not in his presence when he signed, and that
the witnesses need not sign in the presence of each other.62 The
caveators in In re Estate of Edith Brown Brannon' did not deny that
the will satisfied those requirements. Instead, they argued that an
unusual feature of the will was itself sufficient to create an opportunity
for fraud and thus to raise a triable issue of fact, which in turn, would
make it erroneous for the court to grant summary judgment." The
supreme court, though, affirmed the trial court's disposition of the
case.'
The unusual feature asserted by the caveator was that the
signature of the testatrix and those of the witnesses appeared on
different pages of the will.' Holding this insufficient to raise a triable
issue of fraud, the supreme court stressed that where all the pages of the
will are physically connected, as was apparently the case here, the mere
fact that the testatrix' signature does not appear on the same page as do
those of the witnesses is not sufficient to raise a triable issue of fraud. 7
C.

D. ConstructionProblems
The case of In re Last Will & Testament of Julia D. Lewis' afforded
an excellent opportunity to review the law of future interests, as well as

60.

Id.

61.
62.

263 Ga. at 854, 439 S.E.2d at 493 (Sears-CollinS, J., dissenting).
O.C.GA § 53-2-40 (1982); see also Thornton v. Hulme, 218 Ga. 480, 128 S.E.2d 744

(1962).
63. 264 Ga. 84, 441 S.E.2d 248 (1994).
64. Id. at 84, 441 S.E.2d at 249.
65. Id., 441 S.E.2d at 248.
66. Id., 441 S.E.2d at 249.
67. Id.
68. 263 Ga. 349, 434 S.E.2d 472 (1993).
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the rules of evidence which a court may have to apply in construing a
will creating such interests. Item 2 (c) of the will left the residue, onefourth to the sister Hattie "if she survive me," one-fourth to the sister
Pearl "if she survive me," and the remaining one-half to the nine named
children of testatrix' two deceased brothers, William and Horace, "share
and share alike, per stirpes." It then provided that if either of the
sisters predeceased the testatrix, her share would be added to the
remainder interest going to the nine children of the two deceased
brothers, but added to that group would be the names of the children of
any such deceased sister."
Of the deceased brothers' nine children, three were William's and six
were Horace's. Claiming that the words "share and share alike, per70
stirpes" were ambiguous, the executor filed a bill for construction.
William's three children argued for a per stirpes construction in line
with the Georgia statute of distribution, under which they would get, as
representatives of William, the one-half of the remainder which he would
have taken. 71 Horace's six children argued, however, for a per capita
construction, under which, all the children of these two brothers would
take equally.72 The two groups each filed affidavits in support of their
respective claims. The trial judge concluded that the testatrix' intention
could be ascertained from the language of the will alone, construed in its
entirety and without the need of parol evidence or of the affidavits. He
then concluded that the remainder should be distributed per capita
among all the children of the two brothers.7 3
The supreme court affirmed the decision.74 Absent a contrary
intention expressed in the will, a testator is presumed to have intended
a per stirpes distribution; however, a cardinal rule of construction is that
the intention is found, not in any particular part of the will, but rather
by a "four-comers" examination of the entire document. 5 The trial
court, then, did not err in construing the apparently inconsistent
language in light of the entire will. 6
The supreme court, quite helpfully, elaborated upon the application of
the "four comers" rule to this will.77 Evidence of the testatrix' scheme
of distribution first appeared in the gifts of one-fourth to each of the two

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id. at 350, 434 S.E.2d at 473.
Id.
263 Ga. at 351, 434 S.E.2d at 473 (citing O.C.GA. § 53-4-2(5) (1994)).
Id. at 350, 434 S.E.2d at 473.
Id.
Id. at 353, 434 S.E.2d at 475.
Id. at 351, 434 S.E.2d at 473.
Id.
Id.
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sisters. These were made expressly contingent upon a sister's surviving
the testatrix. Had that condition not been included, the share of a
predeceased sister would have gone, under the lapse statute,"' to the
issue of that sister.7" However, in directing that the issue of a predeceased sister then be added to the original list of the issue of the two
predeceased brothers, the testatrix showed an intention, through per
capita distribution, to treat equally all the children of her predeceased
siblings.80
E.

Renunciation

The right of a legatee or devisee to renounce a testamentary gift has
long been recognized. Whether that right has been properly exercised,
however, is often not clear. The most recent illustration of this problem
is found in Jordan v. Trower.1 The testator was survived by his
daughter as sole heir, but his will left the entire estate in trust for the
twenty-year old child of that daughter. The will was probated in April
of 1990, and on the following May 1, the granddaughter filed her
renunciation of any interest in the estate, as authorized by the terms of
Georgia's renunciation statute.' There being no other beneficiary
named in the will, the daughter requested that the co-executors/trustees
relinquish the entire estate to her as sole heir. They refused to do so on
the ground that the granddaughter, sole taker under the will, was
barred from renouncing because earlier she had accepted $490 from the
estate to purchase clothing for the funeral and other expenses.'
The supreme court affirmed the lower court's judgment that there had
The statute does
been no valid renunciation by the granddaughter."
not contemplate the beneficiary's accepting such a de minimis amount
that was never intended as an assertion of an ownership claim of any
The alternative argument against allowing the
estate assets.'
granddaughter to take under the will was that it would frustrate the
testator's intention to leave his entire estate to the granddaughter.'M
This argument was held to be groundless.' Every testator is presumed
to know when he executes his will that the law allows a beneficiary to

78. O.C.G.A. § 53-2-103 (1982).
79. 263 Ga. at 352, 434 S.E.2d at 473.

80.
81.
82.
83.

Id., 434 S.E.2d at 474.
208 Ga. App. 552, 431 S.E.2d 160 (1993).
Id. at 552, 431 S.E.2d at 162 (citing O.C.GA. § 53-2-115 (Supp. 1994)).
Id.

84.
85.
86.
87.

Id. at 555, 431 S.E.2d at 164.
Id. at 553, 431 S.E.2d at 162.
Id.
Id., 431 S.E.2d at 163.
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renounce benefits under it, and to that extent, to vary dispositions made
by the will.88
II.
A.

RECENT DECISIONS-TRUSTS

Private Trusts

Family Trusts-Successor Trustees. An inter vivos family trust,
likely to last for decades and with various family members being both cotrustees and co-beneficiaries, is a fit subject for litigation no matter how
carefully the trust instrument is drafted. Ferst v. Ferst" involved such
a trust. That trust was established by the settlor in 1937, naming his
wife, Helen, both as the sole life beneficiary and as one of three trustees,
and providing that his son, Robert, should become a co-trustee upon
reaching the age of twenty-one. Remainder beneficiaries were a
daughter of the settlor and the two daughters of Robert. The settlor and
two of the trustees died some years later, leaving the settlor's wife,
Helen, and his son, Robert, as trustees. 0
Early in 1991, one month prior to his death, Robert purported to
appoint his wife, Jeanne, to succeed him as trustee in the event of his
inability or unwillingness to serve. The record does not show that Helen
concurred. Jeanne petitioned for confirmation of her appointment and
for removal of Helen, her mother-in-law, as a trustee. The remainder
beneficiaries counterclaimed for their appointment as trustees and for
the removal of Helen as trustee because of her age and diminishing
capacity.9'
.- The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's removal of Helen as a
trustee. 92 The court then appointed three of the other beneficiaries as
trustees, but refused to qualify Jeanne because her appointment by the
son, Robert, was not authorized by a majority of the surviving trustees.93 The 1937 trust instrument specified that a majority of the
trustees should control in all matters, including the naming of successor
trustees; hence, Robert's attempt to appoint his wife Jeanne was
ineffective. The result was that Robert continued as a trustee until his
death. 4

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Id., 431 S.E.2d at 162.
208 Ga. App. 846, 432 S.E.2d 227 (1993).
Id at 846, 432 S.E.2d at 228.
Id. at 846-47, 432 S.E.2d at 228.
Id at 847, 432 S.E.2d at 229.
Id.

94. Id.
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The court apparently reasoned that this was a family dispute over a
trust which had been active for well over fifty years and never should
have found its way into the courts. The opinion strongly suggests this
possibility by statements that the express language of the trust
instrument was unambiguous, and the "clear meaning" was that a
majority of the serving trustees should appoint a successor to any
deceased trustee.9'
Spendthrift Trusts-Creditors' Rights. The case of Speed v.
Speed" gave the supreme court its first opportunity to construe the
spendthrift trust provisions of the Georgia Trust Act."' In that case, a
husband and wife had been seriously injured in an automobile accident
and had obtained a large settlement with the automobile manufacturer.
The husband transferred his portion into an irrevocable trust for himself
as sole beneficiary. The trust instrument gave the trustee discretion to
pay trust principal or interest for the husband's maintenance and
support, and any remainder at his death to be distributed pursuant to
the terms of his will. Finally, this instrument contained a spendthrift
clause that prohibited involuntary alienation of trust property for
satisfaction of the debts or obligations of the husband." In a subsequent divorce action, the trial court held that since the husband's
interest in the trust property had been irrevocably transferred out of his
estate, it was no longer his property and was not subject to the wife's
claims for alimony and equitable distribution."
In reversing the trial court, the supreme court specifically addressed
the language of the new Georgia Trust Act dealing with spendthrift
trusts.0 0 The cited subsection first recognized the validity of a
spendthrift trust provision prohibiting involuntary alienation of the
beneficiary's interest by stating "[eixcept as otherwise provided in this
subsection ... ."" The next sentence declared such a spendthrift
provision invalid if the beneficiary is the settlor. 2 The following
sentence declared any such spendthrift provision invalid as to claims for
alimony against the interest of such a beneficiary, other than one whose
physical or mental disability substantially impairs his ability to provide

95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Id.
263 Ga. 166, 430 S.E.2d 348 (1993).
1991 Ga. Laws 810 (codified at O.C.G.A. § 53-12-18 (Supp. 1994)).
263 Ga. at 167, 430 S.E.2d at 348-49.
Id. at 166, 430 S.E.2d at 348.
Id. at 167, 430 S.E.2d at 349 (citing O.C.G.A. § 53-12-28(c) (Supp. 1994)).
O.C.GA § 53-12-28(c) (Supp. 1994).
Id.
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for his care and custody."3 The husband relied on this "other than"
language, arguing that because this exception did not apply to disabled
beneficiaries like himself, his interest was completely protected.1 ' The
supreme court, though, emphasized the previous independent sentence,
holding that it prohibited any settlor, disabled or not, from protecting his
assets by simply putting them in a spendthrift trust. 0 5 The supreme
court further explained that holding otherwise would be contrary to prior
trust law in Georgia and to the express language of the new Georgia
Trust Act that a spendthrift clause is not valid if the beneficiary was
'
also the settlor.'
B.

CharitableTrusts

Exemption of Property from Ad Valorem Taxation. In 1993 the
issue of the exemption from ad valorem taxation of two Masonic lodges
reached a Georgia appellate court for the third time. 7 On the first
appearance, the court of appeals held the lodges not entitled to the
exemption because they were not used exclusively for charitable
purposes, they were used only by members of the lodges, and they were
not open to the public."8 The supreme court reversed this decision
and remanded the case to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing on
whether the lodges qualified as institutions of "purely public charity"
under the language of the Georgia exemption statute.'09 In this
opinion, the supreme court named three factors that must be considered
by the trial court and which must be found to coexist in order to qualify
the property for ad valorem tax exemption." 0 They were: (1) the
institution must be devoted entirely to charitable pursuits; (2) these
pursuits must be for the benefit of the public; and (3) "the use of the
property must be exclusively devoted to those charitable pursuits.""'
On remand, the trial court applied this test and concluded that the

103. Id.
104. Speed v. Speed, 263 Ga. 166, 167, 430 S.E.2d 348, 349 (1993).
105. Id. at 168, 430 S.E.2d at 349.
106. Id. at 167, 168, 430 S.E.2d at 349 (citing Sargeant v. Burdett, 96 Ga. 111, 117, 22
S.E. 667 (1895)).
107. Board of Equalization v. York Rite Bodies of Freemasonry of Savannah, 209 Ga.
App. 359, 433 S.E.2d 299 (1993).
108. York Rite Bodies of Freemasonry of Savannah v. Board of Equalization, 198 Ga.
App. 147, 401 S.E.2d 30 (1990), cert. granted.
109. York Rite Bodies of Freemasonry of Savannah v. Board of Equalization of
Chatham County, 261 Ga. 558, 560, 408 S.E.2d 699, 701 (1991).
110. 261 Ga. at 558, 408 S.E.2d at 700.
111. Id.
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lodges were
entitled to the exemption as institutions of "purely public
charity."112
On the appeal of this decision, the court of appeals reversed the trial
court, finding the trial court's decision "clearly erroneous."" 3 Undisputed evidence showed that the property was not "exclusively" devoted
to charitable purposes. Instead, the evidence showed only fifty-eight
percent of the total philanthropic dollars were used to benefit the
general public, while forty-two percent were used for the benefit of
Masons only."4 The court stressed that nothing in its opinion contradicts the benevolent purposes served by Masonic organizations." 5
Instead, the court stressed that usage of these funds did not constitute
an "exclusive" use for charitable purposes.'
In short, "benevolence"
is not synonymous with "charitable" under the language of the tax
exemption provision.
Termination of a Charitable Trust. While a charitable trust may
last forever, it may also be subject to a reverter clause which terminates
its existence." 7 Whether such a clause had been activated was the
issue in First Rebecca Baptist Church, Inc. v. Atlantic Cotton Mills &
Rivoli Crossing Baptist Church, Inc."'
Plaintiff, Atlantic Mills,
conveyed a tract of land to "Rebecca Baptist Church" in 1947 for its sole
use as a place of worship by the congregation of said church, "but only
so long as said lot is used for such church purposes," and if it should
ever cease to be so used, then all right, title and interest in the property
shall revert to the grantor." Until 1979 the named grantee used the
tract and the church constructed on it as its place of worship. In that
year, the majority of the congregation voted to move to another location,
at Rivoli Crossing. However, the minority, with the permission of the
majority (the Rivoli Crossing group), continued to worship on the tract
under the new name of "First Rebecca Baptist Church."n2
The grantor, Atlantic Mills, sued for a declaration that the cessation
of the use of the tract by the original grantee, Rebecca Baptist Church,
activated the reverter clause putting the fee simple title back in the

112. 209 Ga. App. at 359, 433 S.E.2d at 299.
113. Id., 433 S.E.2d at 300.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 360, 433 S.E.2d at 301.
116. Id.
117. First Rebecca Baptist Church, Inc. v. Atlantic Cotton Mills & Rivoli Crossing
Baptist Church, Inc., 263 Ga. 688, 440 S.E.2d 159 (1993).
118. 263 Ga. 688, 440 S.E.2d 159 (1993).
119. Id. at 688, 440 S.E.2d at 160.
120. Id.
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grantor. The trial court found that the Rivoli Crossing group and their
new church did not activate the reverter clause by allowing the "First
Rebecca Baptist Church" to continue worshiping at the original site. 2'1
The supreme court reversed this finding, stressing certain words and
phrases used in the reverter clause.2 2 The term "sole use," for
example, referred to sole use by the grantee, Rebecca Baptist Church,
now Rivoli Crossing Baptist Church.'28 The court found the use by
"First Rebecca Baptist Church," created by the minority group, is not a
use by Rivoli Crossing Baptist Church. 24
III. RECENT LEGISLATION
The 1994 session of the General Assembly addressed several subjects
which are of some importance to fiduciary lawyers. These will be
discussed only briefly.
A.

Service Upon Minors and IncapacitatedAdults
The methods of effecting service upon a minor or an incapacitated
adult in a probate court proceeding were clarified by the enactment of
a new section dealing only with such persons." This section provides
that when service on such a person is required it may be made either by
the probate court's certified mailing of a copy of the document to the
minor or incapacitated adult, or by its service upon the legal guardian
or guardian ad litem of such person." The guardian must acknowledge receipt of the service and certify that he or she will actually deliver
a copy of the document to the ward.'
The acknowledgment
and
28
certification shall then be filed as proof of such service.'

B.

FiduciaryBonds
Former O.C.G.A. section 53-7-50 provided simply that a judgment
against the principal or the surety on the bond of a fiduciary could be
levied upon any property of any defendant in fi fa.'
The new section
expands to authorize the probate judge to enter a judgment and to issue
execution against the principal and surety, and further, to grant

121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 689, 440 S.E.2d at 160.
1994 Ga. Laws 725 (codified at O.C.GA. § 15-9-17 (Interim Supp. 1994)).
O.C.G.A § 15-9-17 (Interim Supp. 1994).
Id.
Id.
Id. § 53-7-50.

532

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46

judgment and execution in favor of the surety against the principal upon
payment of the judgment by the surety.m°
Temporary Administrator
Traditionally, the temporary administrator was little more than a
custodian of estate assets until the qualification of a permanent
administrator.131 Regarding an administrator's power to sell realty,
the prior law, coupled with the recognition of a temporary administrator
as only a custodian, provided that only the "administrator or executor"
could petition for authority to sell assets.132 This power has now been
expanded to allow the same privilege to a temporary administrator.'
The same enactment similarly expanded O.C.G.A. section 53-8-34 to
allow authorization of a private sale by a temporary administrator.13
C.

D.

Transferability of CertainFuture Interests
At least since Georgia's first complete code, a contingent remainder
was descendible only if the contingency was as to an event and not as to
the person, that is as to the identity of the remainderman. 5 The
same logic has been applied to the alienability and devisability of such
an interest. 3 For the stated purpose of clarifying the law regarding
the alienability of future interests, the General Assembly deleted one
section of the code1" 7 and amended another" to provide simply that
"[fluture interests or estates are descendible, devisable, and alienable in
the same manner as estates in possession."139
IV. CONCLUSION

The appellate courts of Georgia and the General Assembly brought
many aspects of fiduciary law under scrutiny. For example, in the area
of trust law, the courts addressed the applicability of the 1991 Georgia
Trust Act to spendthrift trusts. 4 0 Also, in the area of property law,

130.

1994 Ga. Laws 1173 (codified at O.C.G.A. § 53-7-50 (Cum. Supp. 1994)).

131.

See DANIEL H. REDFEARN, WILLS AND ADMINISTRATION IN GEORGIA § 249 (5th ed.

1988).
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

See O.C.G.A. § 53-8-23 (1982).
Id. § 53-8-23 (Cum. Supp. 1994).
Id.
Ga. Code § 2248 (1863).
See Morse v. Proper, 82 Ga. 13, 8 S.E. 625 (1889).
O.C.G.A. § 446-63 (1991) (repealed 1994).
Id. § 44-5-40 (1991 & Cum. Supp. 1994) (amended 1994).
1994 Ga. Laws 364 § 1(codified at O.C.G.A. § 44-5-40 (Cum. Supp. 1994)).
See supra note 95.
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the General Assembly clarified the 1860 statute governing the descendability and devisability of future interests. 4 1 These serve as examples
of the continuing evolvement of Georgia's fiduciary law.

141.

See supra note 138.

